Writeprocessmemory monitor

Author: e | 2025-04-25

WriteProcessMemory Monitor version 1.2 (WPM_Monitor.exe). WriteProcessMemory Monitor is designed to monitor processes

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Encoded.Question 4Which functions does the shellcode manually import?Answer 4To answer this question we need to look at the shellcode itself. One way to do this is to create breakpoints associated with relevant API calls we discovered were being used to inject into Internet Explorer, particularly ‘WriteProcessMemory’. By Opening this in OllyDbg2, we can easily pivot to the instance of WriteProcessMemory by using CTRL + G and locating the appropriate label.By creating a breakpoint here and beginning to step into the next assembly instructions, we can see that this is writing a buffer from 0x407030 where our shellcode resides for the next 423 bytes.By following this in our dump we can see at a glance approximately where the shellcode starts and finishes based on the data shown.From here we can dump this to a file to get the shellcode which will be injected into Internet Explorer.If we open this in IDA and begin converting it to code using ‘c’ we will soon get to a section which contains the decoding routine.This helps to prove the code will be injected into Internet Explorer, and once injected will perform decoding of the shellcode before execution; however, it doesn’t answer what imports this has. By running it through scdbg like we did previously we can see it shows the decoding stub assembly in addition to what the shellcode is essentially trying to do.scdbg -f Lab19-02_00407000.bin -findscFrom this we know that the shellcode is at least importing the following functions. LoadLibraryA WSAStartup WSASocket connect GetCurrentProcess TerminateProcessWe also now know that this is designed to connect back to a host at 192.168.200.2 on TCP port 13330.One way we can debug the shellcode after our decoding routine has executed, is to create a breakpoint at 0x407041 after the shellcode has decoded, and set our origin to the start of the shellcode 0x407030.Once we hit our breakpoint using F9, we can once again dump the decoded shellcode into a file.If we run scdbg over it again we can see a similar result, only this time the assembly shown is different. This will still contain the decoding routine, as

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Library, plus the NULL terminator.On success pArgumentAddress will point somewhere in the target’s memory. This is not your process memory, so you can’t write directly there, just take the address for the next step.Write the argument into the target’s memoryWith pArgumentAddress pointing to the target’s memory obtained in the previous code, we’ll call WriteProcessMemory to write into the actual path and filename:if (!WriteProcessMemory(processHandle, pArgumentAddress, szfullDllName,szfullDllNameSize, NULL)){// Failure}Create a remote threadNow that we have the function’s argument in a known memory position, it’s time to work the real magic:By using CreateRemoteThread, we will execute LoadLibraryA into the target’s process (whose address we have obtained before) passing to it the full path of the library that we want to load.This will happen before your very eyes:HANDLE remoteThread = CreateRemoteThread(processHandle, NULL, 0x100000, loadLibraryExAddress, pArgumentAddress ,NULL);if everything goes well, within some nanoseconds LoadLibraryA will be executed on the target process, and DllMain will be called.Check for completionWe can’t get the return value of LoadLibraryA, so in a real world application we recommend the usage of some IPC signaling (for example, an IPC event via OpenEvent ) to control the success of the DLL initialization on the other side. The specific code needed depends greatly on what you want to check, so we won’t reproduce it here.Also, you should return from DllMain as soon as possible, creating another thread local to the process from DllMain to continue the work from there.From the injection code point of view, now it’s time to just call WaitForSingleObject to wait for the remote thread to be terminated:DWORD result = WaitForSingleObject(remoteThread, TIMEOUT_MILISECONDS);if (result != WAIT_OBJECT_0) {// Error}// Check here your IPC event or whatever other method that// you implemented to check if your injected DLL has been succeedClean up and exitTo finish, even if they were only a few bytes, we want to be polite and clean up unneeded memory and the process handle.if (processHandle) CloseHandle(processHandle);if (pArgumentAddress) VirtualFreeEx(processHandle, pArgumentAddress, 0, MEM_RELEASE);ConclusionsEven tough Windows doesn’t provide a standard method, nor a well documented procedure to perform a proper DLL injection, the indicated steps should work for the vast majority of applications.You can take it as a good base to take on the implementation of a DLL injector on your own.However, there are some applications hostile to this technique; particularly, some anti-debugger code will quickly complain because the start of the DLL can be detected very easily.Or maybe, the LoadLibraryA function that you are calling has been patched (hooked) and will refuse the loading of any DLL that is unknown to the application.There are hundreds of scenarios where one application may block your “standard” injection attempt.To circumvent this counter-measures, there are more powerful techniques such as the so-called “reflective DLL loading”, which basically avoids calling the LoadLibraryA function by implementing alternative custom loaders.This way, the injection process is more stealth and more difficult to be detected and blocked.But techniques that fall into the dark side are a horse of a different color -and may be subject to a whole new article ;)

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Cheat examplesProject modulesProjectDescriptioninjectorDll injector (uses CreateRemoteThread with LoadLibraryA)internalCheatDLL-library to inject into the target process using injectorexternalCheatExternal cheat, which uses ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemorygameRPG-like game with basic inventory and fight systems.gameUnitTestsUnit tests for the game.InjectorThe injector is a simple console application, which injects a DLL into a target process. It uses CreateRemoteThread with LoadLibraryA to inject the DLL.Internal CheatInternal cheat is a DLL-library, which is injected into the target process using injector. It uses pattern scanning to find the addresses of the game's variables.How it worksThe DLL is injected into the target process using injector.// Write DLL path to newly allocated memoryWriteProcessMemory(psHandle, psMemoryLibPath, fullLibPath, MAX_PATH, &fullLibPathSize);// Get address of LoadLibraryAFARPROC loadLibraryA = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32"), "LoadLibraryA");// Call LoadLibraryA in remote process to load DLLCreateRemoteThread(psHandle, NULL, NULL, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)loadLibraryA, psMemoryLibPath, NULL, NULL);After the dll is injected it will begin it's execution in the memory space of the target process. The first thing it does is to find the address of the hp variable.(PatternScan::find_pattern_internal("50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FD FD FD FD"));">// InternalCheat.cppmem_region = reinterpret_castvoid*>(PatternScan::find_pattern_internal("50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FD FD FD FD"));The final step is to start the cheat loop. Every 5 seconds the cheat will set hp variable to INT_MAX.(reinterpret_cast(mem_region) + hpOffset);while (true){ *player_health = INT_MAX; // update player's health std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5000)); // sleep for 5 seconds}">// InternalCheat.cppconst auto player_health = reinterpret_castint*>(reinterpret_cast(mem_region) + hpOffset);while (true){ *player_health = INT_MAX; // update player's health std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5000)); // sleep for 5 seconds}Final results:External CheatSimplified version of injector-like cheat.This version uses ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemory to manipulate values inside process memory space.How it worksThe cheat tries to acquire a handle to the target process.// Get a handle to the processactivePsHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, false, pid);If previous step was successful, the cheat will try to find the address of the hp variable.(PatternScan::find_pattern_external(activePsHandle, "50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FD FD FD FD"));">// ExternalCheat.cppmem_region = reinterpret_castvoid*>(PatternScan::find_pattern_external(activePsHandle, "50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FD FD FD FD"));If pattern scanning was successful, the cheat will start the cheat loop. Every 5 seconds the cheat will set hp variable to INT_MAX.(mem_region) + hpOffset, &newHp)) { std::wcout while (true){ int newHp = INT_MAX; if (!WriteMem(activePsHandle, reinterpret_cast(mem_region) + hpOffset, &newHp)) { std::wcout "[-] Cannot write process memory!\n"; } std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(5000));}Final results:The GameTo test developed cheats I've created a simple game with basic inventory and fight systems. The game is written in C++.Main menu:[c]reate - Creates a new player with default stats (63hp, 4dmg).[f]ight - fight with a random enemy (only active, if you have an active player)[s]tats - view your player stats[i]inventory - displays your inventory or allows you to select a new active item. (if you have an active player)[e]xit - closes the gameFight menu:[a]ttack - attack an enemy[h]eal - heal yourself[r]un - run away from the enemyInventory menu:[d]isplay - displays your inventory[e]quip - allows you to select. WriteProcessMemory Monitor version 1.2 (WPM_Monitor.exe). WriteProcessMemory Monitor is designed to monitor processes

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More data is available. ERROR_CANNOT_COPY 266 (0x10A) The copy functions cannot be used. ERROR_DIRECTORY 267 (0x10B) The directory name is invalid. ERROR_EAS_DIDNT_FIT 275 (0x113) The extended attributes did not fit in the buffer. ERROR_EA_FILE_CORRUPT 276 (0x114) The extended attribute file on the mounted file system is corrupt. ERROR_EA_TABLE_FULL 277 (0x115) The extended attribute table file is full. ERROR_INVALID_EA_HANDLE 278 (0x116) The specified extended attribute handle is invalid. ERROR_EAS_NOT_SUPPORTED 282 (0x11A) The mounted file system does not support extended attributes. ERROR_NOT_OWNER 288 (0x120) Attempt to release mutex not owned by caller. ERROR_TOO_MANY_POSTS 298 (0x12A) Too many posts were made to a semaphore. ERROR_PARTIAL_COPY 299 (0x12B) Only part of a ReadProcessMemory or WriteProcessMemory request was completed. ERROR_OPLOCK_NOT_GRANTED 300 (0x12C) The oplock request is denied. ERROR_INVALID_OPLOCK_PROTOCOL 301 (0x12D) An invalid oplock acknowledgment was received by the system. ERROR_DISK_TOO_FRAGMENTED 302 (0x12E) The volume is too fragmented to complete this operation. ERROR_DELETE_PENDING 303 (0x12F) The file cannot be opened because it is in the process of being deleted. ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_WITH_GLOBAL_SHORT_NAME_REGISTRY_SETTING 304 (0x130) Short name settings may not be changed on this volume due to the global registry setting. ERROR_SHORT_NAMES_NOT_ENABLED_ON_VOLUME 305 (0x131) Short names are not enabled on this volume. ERROR_SECURITY_STREAM_IS_INCONSISTENT 306 (0x132) The security stream for the given volume is in an inconsistent state. Please run CHKDSK on the volume. ERROR_INVALID_LOCK_RANGE 307 (0x133) A requested file lock operation cannot be processed due to an invalid byte range. ERROR_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NOT_PRESENT 308 (0x134) The subsystem needed to support the image type is not present. ERROR_NOTIFICATION_GUID_ALREADY_DEFINED 309 (0x135) The specified

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Read And Write User Mode Process Via Ring0 []This project uses a kernel mode driver in co-operation with a user mode program to establish a method of reading / writing virtual memory from a regular win32 program without having to use regular WinAPI Functions. This happens by using a driver to execute the reading / writing of the memory itself from a lower level. This means the user mode program does not have to open any handles to csgo or use ReadProcessMemory or WriteProcessMemory nor any functions that has to deal with process handles. VAC’s defence against external cheats is based on system handle scanning on user level. VAC scans handles in the system (ring3), when it finds a handle which for example points to cs:go, the process that holds that handle will be analysed.This can be avoided by not opening any handles to csgo (OpenProcess()), but it also means we can’t use any WinAPI Functions to Read/Write the memory of the process that we want, so we must go to a lower level. As of now, VAC or valve does not have any drivers which means if we can write & get kernel code running defeating vac is possible.Then a scanning thread is created. This thread repeatedly scans all handles in the system (calls NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemHandleInformation information class) for handles to the process its running from and logs any process holding it into the first section object. VAC uses NtQueryInformationProcess with ProcessImageFileName information class to find the image name of the process, tries to open it with NtCreateFile and uses GetFileInformationByHandle to get the volume serial number and the file identifier (it won't change if you rename or move the file).

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According to this publication, the senior military leaders reported the malware breach incident that affected the U.S. Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. This is a classification from F-Secure. Other vendors name this threat mostly as Autorun. Some of the aliases assigned to this threat might seem confusing. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. This post is about F-Secure-classified Agent.btz – the one that was involved into the aforementioned incident.At the time of this writing, ThreatExpert system has received and processed several different samples of this threat – further referred as Agent.btz. All these builds exhibit common functionality.Agent.btz is a DLL file. When loaded, its exported function DllEntryPoint() will be called automatically. Another exported function of this DLL, InstallM(),is called during the initial infection stage, via a command-line parameter for the system file rundll32.exe.Infection VectorThe infection normally occurs via a removable disk such as thumb drive (USB stick) or any other external hard drive. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. It will drop its copy on it and it will create autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. When a clean computer recognizes a newly connected removable drive, it will (by default) detect autorun.inf file on it, it will then open it and follow its instruction to load the malware.Another infection vector: when a clean computer attempts to map a drive letter to a shared network resource that has Agent.atz on it and the corresponding autorun.inf file, it will (by default) open autorun.inf file and follow its instruction to load the malware. Once infected, it will do the same with other removable drives connected to it or other computers in the network that attempt to map a drive letter to its shared drive infected with Agent.atz – hence, the replication.The autorun.inf file it creates contains the following command to run rundll32.exe:rundll32.exe .\\[random_name].dll,InstallMFunctionalityWhen Agent.btz DLL is loaded, it will decrypt some of the strings inside its body. Agent.btz file is not packed. The strings it decrypts are mostly filenames, API names, registry entries, etc.After decrypting its strings, Agent.btz dynamically retrieves function pointers to the following kernel32.dll APIs: WriteProcessMemory(), VirtualAllocEx(), VirtualProtectEx(). It will need these APIs later to inject malicious code into Internet Explorer process.Agent.btz spawns several threads and registers window class "zQWwe2esf34356d".The first thread will try to query several parameters from the values under the registry key:HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\StrtdCfgSome of these parameters contain such details as time out periods, flags, or the name of the domain from which the additional components can be downloaded.The first thread will spawn 2 additional threads. One of them will wait for 5 minutes, and then it will attempt to download an encrypted binary from the domain specified in the parameters.For example, it. WriteProcessMemory Monitor version 1.2 (WPM_Monitor.exe). WriteProcessMemory Monitor is designed to monitor processes WriteProcessMemory Monitor (WPM_Monitor.exe) - user ratings. WriteProcessMemory Monitor is designed to monitor processes